Algrant v. Evergreen Valley by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-16-1997 
Algrant v. Evergreen Valley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"Algrant v. Evergreen Valley" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 219. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/219 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed September 16, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 96-1994 
 
ROLAND R. ALGRANT; THE DOUGLAS F. ALLISON 
TRUST; ANCHOR SALES ASSOCIATES, INC; DANIEL 
AVERY; JAMES B. BAGLEY; THOMAS S. BORON; MARY 
PAT BORON; FRANKLIN EDWARD CATER, JR.; PAUL W. 
DLABAL; MICHAEL B. ELEFANTE; HERBERT FISHER; 
SUSAN E. HAAR; MARILYN C. HARLIN; STEVEN G. 
HOROWITZ; HERBERT J. HOSTETLER; RUDOLPH S. 
MAURIZI ESTATE; DR. P. JAGANNADHA REDDY; E.W. 
RICHARDON, JR.; PATRICK RUPPERT; SUSAN SLOAN; 
NARENDRA K. SOOD; USHA R. SOOD; GEORGE L. 
YONANO; LUCRETIA L. YONANO, 
       Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
EVERGREEN VALLEY NURSERIES LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; THE PARKINSON PENSION TRUST; E. 
WAYNE POCIUS; RUSSELL M. DIMMICK; VAN PINES OF 
PA; WILLIAM L. PARKINSON, DR.; UNIQUE GARDEN 
CENTER COMPANY 
 
An Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
Civil Action No. 95-CV-7224 
 
Argued June 13, 1997 
 
Before: MANSMANN, NYGAARD and ROSENN, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed September 16, 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
       Alexander D. Bono (argued) 
       Timothy D. Katsiff 
       Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley 
       1200 Four Penn Center Plaza 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103 
       Counsel for Appellants 
 
       E. Parry Warner (argued) 
       Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & 
        Hippell 
       One Penn Center, 19th Floor 
       1617 John F. Kennedy Boulevard 
       Philadelphia, PA 19103-1895 
       Counsel for Appellees The Parkinson 
        Pension Trust and Dr. William L. 
        Parkinson 
 
       Joseph A. McGinley (argued) 
       Lavin, Coleman, O'Neil, Ricci, 
        Finarelli & Gray 
       510 Walnut Street, Suite 1000 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
       Counsel for Appellees E. Wayne 
        Pocius, Russell M. Dimmick, 
        Van Pines of Pennsylvania, 
        and Unique Garden Center 
        Company 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal raises two important issues of first 
impression in this court relating to commercial promissory 
obligations and securities. First, whether the obligors on 
unmatured promissory notes can obtain declaratory relief 
against the obligees of those notes and have the notes 
declared void and unenforceable, when the concurrent legal 
remedy underlying the request for declaratory relief would 
be barred by the statute of limitations. Second, whether 
transactions involving investment securities are covered 
under section 9.2(a) of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade 
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Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTP/CPL"), which 
creates a private right of action for consumers injured in 
the purchase or lease of goods or services. The United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania held that the action for declaratory relief was 
time-barred because the corollary legal actions were based 
on conduct for which the statute of limitations had run. 
The court also held that investment securities are not 
"goods" under the UTP/CPL. The plaintiffs timely appealed. 
We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, as did the district court, it appears that in 1986 
the defendants organized Evergreen Valley Nurseries 
Limited Partnership ("Evergreen") to acquire, grow and sell 
nursery stock. The nursery stock consisted of 
approximately 950,000 evergreen trees ("nursery stock") on 
two leased properties in Pennsylvania, one in Lehigh 
County (called "Raven Valley") and one in Tioga County 
(called "the Tioga Farm"). In July 1986, the Parkinson 
Pension Trust ("Trust"), at the direction of Dr. William L. 
Parkinson, its sole trustee, purchased the Raven Valley 
nursery stock from Van Pines of Pennsylvania ("Van Pines") 
and its general partners for approximately $3.6 million. E. 
Wayne Pocius and Russell Dimmick are the general 
partners of Van Pines and are also the sole shareholders of 
Unique Garden Center ("Unique"), the general partner of 
Evergreen. The Trust then purchased the Tioga Farm 
nursery stock from Pocius and Dimmick for approximately 
$600,000. 
 
Following the acquisition of the nursery stock by the 
Trust, Evergreen then purchased an undivided 91.2% 
interest in the Trust's nursery stock for the price of $10.4 
million. Evergreen financed the purchase of the nursery 
stock by a $13.5 million offering of Evergreen limited 
partnership units, pursuant to a private placement 
memorandum ("PPM"). A substantial number of these units 
purchased by the plaintiffs are the genesis of this lawsuit. 
They paid $150,000 for each unit under the terms of the 
PPM; the purchase price consisted of a $70,000 cash 
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payment, a $9,500 subscription note due on January 20, 
1997, and a $70,500 promissory note ("investor note") 
payable to the Trust, which became due and payable on 
July 1, 1996. 
 
The PPM issued by Evergreen did not disclose that 
Evergreen was to pay the Trust approximately $10.4 million 
for 91.2% of the nursery stock which the Trust had 
purchased from Evergreen for about $4.2 million. Thus, it 
failed to disclose that the purchase price for the interest in 
land had more than doubled in two months. The PPM did 
not mention the intricate entanglement of the parties 
involved in the underlying transactions or the self-dealing 
in the purchase of the nursery stock. 
 
In 1989, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued a 
report concluding that the price of the nursery stock had 
been significantly overvalued. Although Evergreen initially 
contested the IRS report, in 1993 Evergreen and the IRS 
entered into a closing agreement in which Evergreen 
admitted that the nursery stock had been over-valued by at 
least $3.2 million. On October 11, 1993, the plaintiffs 
obtained a copy of the closing agreement between the IRS 
and Evergreen. 
 The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the district court on 
November 16, 1995, raising four claims. The first three 
claims sought a declaratory judgment that certain Investor 
Notes were void and unenforceable because they had been 
procured through fraud: (I) declaratory relief under Section 
29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
S 78cc(b) (Supp. 1997); (II) declaratory relief under Section 
508 of the Pennsylvania Securities Act, 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 1-508 (1994); and (III) declaratory relief based on common 
law fraud. Count IV alleged a violation of the UTP/CPL. The 
plaintiffs asserted that because of the Trust's expressed 
intent to collect on the investor notes in July 1996, they 
were compelled to bring this action to declare the notes void 
and unenforceable. 
 
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to state 
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district 
court dismissed Counts I, II, and III as time-barred and 
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dismissed Count IV for failing to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted. The plaintiffs appealed from the 
dismissal of all four claims. 
 
II. 
 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
on statute of limitations grounds, the court exercises 
plenary review to determine "whether `the time alleged in 
the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has 
not been brought within the statute of limitations.' " Cito v. 
Bridgewater Township Police Dep't, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 
1989) (citations and emphasis omitted). This court 
exercises plenary review over a district court order 
dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Moore v. 
Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Because actions for declaratory relief do not have their 
own statute of limitations, the district court concluded that 
the plaintiffs' causes of action are governed by the period of 
limitations applicable to the substantive claims underlying 
the action, citing Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463-64 
(1947). Thus, the district court held that the statute of 
limitations to be applied would be the same regardless of 
the posture of the case, whether offensive or defensive. 
Accordingly, if the underlying action is time-barred, so is 
the action for declaratory relief. Judge Huyett, the trial 
judge, then perceptively determined that Counts I, II, and 
III were all barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
 
Although this court of appeals has not yet spoken on the 
issue, a number of other courts have. The First, Sixth, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have all held 
that an action for declaratory relief will be barred to the 
same extent the applicable statute of limitations bars the 
concurrent legal remedy. International Ass'n of Machinists 
& Aerospace Workers v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 108 
F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 1997); Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm 
Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1993); Gilbert v. City 
of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 57-58 (1st Cir. 1991); Clulow v. 
Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1302 (10th Cir. 1983)."It is 
settled, therefore, that where legal and equitable claims 
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coexist, equitable remedies will be withheld if an applicable 
statute of limitations bars the concurrent legal remedy." 
Gilbert, 932 F.2d at 57. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, applying state law, has also held that when 
a "claim for declaratory relief could have been resolved 
through another form of action which has a specific 
limitations period, the specific period of time will govern." 
Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 41-42 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (applying New York law). As the district court 
found in this case, see infra at p. 10-12, the plaintiffs' 
claims could have been resolved by available timely legal 
remedies, including an action to rescind under the federal 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Gatto v. Meridian 
Medical Associates, Inc., 882 F.2d 840, 842 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The aforementioned courts which applied federal law 
relied on analogous Supreme Court precedent to reach this 
conclusion. In Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940), 
the Court recognized the long-standing doctrine that"when 
the jurisdiction of the federal court is concurrent with that 
at law, or the suit is brought in aid of a legal right, equity 
will withhold its remedy if the legal right is barred by the 
local statute of limitations." In Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 
at 464, the Court reiterated this position, stating that 
"equity will withhold its relief in such a case where the 
applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent 
legal remedy." We have followed this proposition. See Gruca 
v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1257 (3d Cir. 
1974). However, neither the Supreme Court nor this court 
has addressed the question in the posture in which it is 
presented in the instant case. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations does 
not bar an action for declaratory relief based on a claim 
that is purely defensive in nature. For this proposition, they 
rely heavily on this court's opinion in Silverman v. Eastrich 
Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1995). In 
Silverman, the plaintiff moved in federal court for injunctive 
and declaratory relief to proclaim a guaranty void after the 
defendants confessed judgment in state court against the 
loan guarantors, including the plaintiff. Id. at 30. The 
defendants moved for dismissal, asserting that the claim 
was time-barred under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
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("ECOA") on which the plaintiff guarantor relied. Id. at 31. 
The trial court granted the motion. Id. On appeal, we held 
that when the creditor endeavors to enforce the guaranty 
the claim could be asserted "as a defense to the state 
confession of judgment." Id. at 32. In Silverman, the 
defendants had not only obtained judgment, in contrast to 
this case where no action has yet begun on the notes, but 
enforcement of the judgment was imminent. Thus, there 
the plaintiffs' challenge to the confession of judgment was 
defensive. 
 
Although Silverman did allow the assertion of a defensive 
claim after the statute of limitations on the underlying 
violation had run, the holding was definitely moored to the 
plaintiff 's defensive position in response to the state 
confession of judgment. The court stated: 
 
       There are numerous circumstances under which a 
       guarantor may institute an action to declare his or her 
       guaranty void and seek damages or other relief. The 
       expiration of the statute of limitations calculated from 
       the execution of said guaranty may bar the institution 
       of such independent action. No such bar exists, 
       however, to the utilization of such grounds as a 
       defense. 
 
51 F.3d at 32. The court noted that "plaintiff retained the 
right to assert the violation when efforts were made to 
collect and enforce the Guaranty." Id. (emphasis added). 
 
In Silverman, the plaintiff had no prior opportunity to 
respond to the state court confession of judgment, thus 
limiting her available remedies to the equitable claim she 
pursued. Id. The court noted that "[the plaintiff's] ECOA 
claim was raised in direct response to Eastrich's state court 
confession of judgment, which did not require or provide for 
an answering pleading. . . . Thus, in essence, plaintiff's 
alleged ECOA violation is asserted as a defense to the state 
confession of judgment." Id. Accordingly, despite plaintiffs' 
assertions in the instant case, Silverman does not stand for 
the proposition that an independent action offensively for 
declaratory relief from potential liability on a note may be 
brought even though the plaintiff had a legal remedy before 
the statute of limitations on the concurrent legal remedy 
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had run. On the contrary, Silverman holds only that where 
judgment has been confessed, a purported obligor may 
assert as a defense to its enforcement a statutory violation 
which would have been time-barred if asserted offensively 
in an independent action.1 In this instant case, however, 
the creditors have taken no legal action to collect on the 
Investors Notes, plaintiffs have no voidable judgment, and 
recoupment is not now before us. 
 
The Supreme Court set forth in Bull v. United States, 295 
U.S. 247 (1935), a rationale similar to Silverman. Bull, a 
partner in a ship-brokering business, died in February and 
his estate continued to receive the profits of his partnership 
for one year after his death. Id. at 251. His estate valued 
the partnership only by the profits received up to Bull's 
death. The United States, however, declared all profits 
received by the estate to be corpus under the estate tax and 
taxed the property accordingly. The estate did not challenge 
the assessment at the time. Id. at 251-52. Four years later, 
the United States notified the estate that the same property 
was income and taxable as such. Id. at 252. The estate 
then pursued the administrative remedies to challenge the 
double taxation of the same property. When the final 
administrative appeal had been rejected, the estate brought 
an action in the Court of Claims, seeking a refund of the 
amount paid as income tax or, in the alternative, a refund 
for the tax paid on the same property when the estate tax 
was paid. Id. at 253. The Court of Claims found that the 
statute of limitations barred the second ground for relief, 
seeking correction of the estate tax. Id. at 254. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The other cases cited by the plaintiffs are equally distinguishable on 
the same grounds. See Sony Electronics v. Putnam, 906 F. Supp. 228 
(D.N.J. 1995) (party could bring time-barred claim as defense to action 
to collect on guaranty but could not assert claim as counterclaim 
seeking monetary damages); FDIC v. Medmark, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 511 
(D. Kan. 1995) (party could assert time-barred claim defensively in action 
by lender to collect on guaranty); Integra Bank/Pittsburgh v. Freeman, 
839 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (party could assert time-barred claim 
by way of recoupment in action by lender to collect on guaranty); Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Pasqualis-Politi, 800 F. Supp. 1297 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (party 
could assert defense which could not be asserted affirmatively because 
of the bar of the statute of limitations when lender brought action to 
collect on mortgage and notes). 
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The Court in Bull first determined that the portion of the 
profits paid the estate was income, not corpus, and thus 
wrongly subjected to the estate tax as such. Id. at 257. The 
Court then held that the claim for refund of the estate tax 
was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court 
noted that, prior to the institution of proceedings to collect 
income tax on the same property, the estate had no 
grounds to seek a refund of the money as a product of 
double taxation. Additionally, the Court noted that, under 
the law, "[p]ayment precedes defense" when challenging a 
tax assessment. Id. at 260. Therefore, the estate was 
entitled to raise the claim only as a defense after paying the 
income tax on the same profits. 
 
       If the claim for income tax deficiency had been the 
       subject of a suit, any counter demand for recoupment 
       of the overpayment of estate tax could have been 
       asserted by way of defense and credit obtained 
       notwithstanding the statute of limitations barred an 
       independent suit against the Government therefor. This 
       is because recoupment is in the nature of a defense 
       arising out of some feature of the transaction upon 
       which the plaintiff's action is grounded. Such a 
       defense is never barred by the statute of limitations so 
       long as the main action itself is timely. 
 
Bull, 295 U.S. at 262. The Court then determined that "[the 
Government] has given [the estate] a right of credit or 
refund, which though he could not assert it in an action 
brought by him in 1930, had accrued and was available to 
him since it was actionable and not barred in 1925, when 
the Government proceeded against him for the collection of 
income tax. The pleading was sufficient to put in issue the 
right to recoupment." Id. at 263. Thus, the estate's claim 
was not barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 
 
Bull, like Silverman, recognizes that a claim can be raised 
defensively even if it would be barred if brought 
independently. Like Silverman, the plaintiff in Bull had no 
opportunity to present the claim as a defense to the tax 
assessment, having been summarily assessed with the tax 
and later compelled to pursue administrative remedies 
before seeking legal adjudication of the right to refund. 
Therefore, despite the unusual posture of the case, the 
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claim was not time-barred because the Court considered it 
as a defense to the judgment obtained against the estate 
administratively.2 The crux of the decision was the 
existence of a claim against the estate. In the present 
matter, the plaintiffs could have asserted their claims 
independently by an action to rescind or other legal options 
within the time allowed by the statute of limitations. They 
chose not to do so. Therefore, their remedy now is to wait 
until the Trust seeks to collect on the notes and then assert 
the claims defensively. However, in the absence of any 
action taken against them to collect the debt, plaintiffs are 
not entitled to bring an independent action essentially 
seeking a recision by posturing it as defensive. 
 
Moreover, the plaintiffs' action before us is not saved by 
the doctrine of recoupment. Under Pennsylvania law, "the 
defense asserted by way of recoupment must be related to 
the nature of the demand brought by the plaintiff." Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Pasqualis-Politi, 800 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 
(W.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Porter v. Levering, 199 A. 482, 484 
(1938)). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted in 
Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 415 A.2d 
689, 694 (Pa. 1980), recoupment is not a set-off "because 
it is not in the nature of a cross demand, but rather it 
lessens or defeats any recovery by the plaintiff." 
Recoupment, then, is a defensive claim which can only be 
asserted in response to an independent action instituted by 
another party; recoupment does not permit the party 
asserting it to present otherwise time-barred claims simply 
by creative pleading in an independent proceeding brought 
by it. 
 
The dissent, in concluding that this declaratory judgment 
action may be maintained despite the long lapse of time 
since the alleged frauds were committed, focuses on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990), the Supreme 
Court stated that "our decisions in Bull and [Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 
532 (1937)] stand only for the proposition that a party litigating a tax 
claim in a timely proceeding may, in that proceeding, seek recoupment 
of a related, and inconsistent, but now time-barred tax claim relating to 
the same transaction." Therefore, the Supreme Court has very 
specifically limited the holding of Bull, and the holding is not 
applicable 
to the situation sub judice. 
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"defendants' expected enforcement of a future obligation," 
dis. op. at 25, rather than on the acts of fraud which is the 
basis of plaintiffs' present claims. The dissent asserts that 
the "substantive claim Algrant seeks to vindicate in 
pursuing Counts I through III is the claim that Algrant is 
not liable for future obligations under the Investors Notes." 
Dis. op. at 21. The plaintiffs, however, allege that the 
Investor Notes were obtained by fraud and specific intent to 
deceive and "are void and unenforceable in their entirety 
because they were induced by fraud" and were made in 
violation of the 1934 Federal Securities Exchange Act, the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act, and Pennsylvania common 
law. The potential collection on the notes is at this time 
only a possibility, not an action in court. However, the door 
has been closed to the right to rescind the notes, and other 
legal options for relief under the federal and state statutes, 
and Pennsylvania common law which the plaintiffs cannot 
now open at this late date by an offensive independent 
action. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
stated, if "a claim for declaratory relief could have been 
resolved through another form of action which has a 
specific limitations period, the specific period of time will 
govern." Georgetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 42 (2d Cir.) 
cert. denied 465 U.S. 1099 (1984). 
 
The theory of plaintiffs' case, and with which the dissent 
agrees, is that they are entitled to declaratory relief now 
and need not wait until action is taken to collect on the 
notes, because they would raise the fraud defense in such 
an event. The court in Gilbert responded to a similar 
argument in these words: 
 
       We find this idea, albeit precocious, to be equally 
       unavailing. The temporal bar cannot be sidestepped 
       merely by asserting that the appellants' declaratory 
       judgment suit was brought to establish defenses 
       against the rainy day, in the future, when the 
       Ordinance might be enforced against them . . . . Such 
       a smoke-and-mirrors approach would place far too 
       much priority on theoretical possibilities at the expense 
       of practical actualities, requiring us, in the last 
       analysis, to treat aggressor as defender, petitioner as 
       respondent. In effect, it would serve to make justiciable 
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       claims which were simultaneously stale (i.e., time- 
       barred as to the actual permit denial) and unripe (i.e., 
       not yet mature as to any potential enforcement action). 
       The decided cases are to the contrary. 
 
932 F.2d at 58. 
 
We, therefore, hold that when plaintiffs' claims are barred 
by a statute of limitations applicable to a concurrent legal 
remedy, then a court will withhold declaratory judgment 
relief in an independent suit essentially predicated upon 
the same cause of action. Otherwise, the statute of 
limitations can be circumvented merely by "[d]raping their 
claim in the raiment of the Declaratory Judgment Act." Id. 
at 58. Accordingly, we turn to each of the plaintiffs' claims 
to determine whether the claim would be barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
 
A. 
 
The district court dismissed Count I as time-barred. 
Count I sought declaratory relief that, pursuant to S 29(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78cc(b), 
the promissory investor notes were void and unenforceable 
because they were obtained by fraud in violation of federal 
securities laws. Under the statute of limitations actually set 
forth in S 29(b) an action pursuant to that section is barred 
one year from the time of discovery of the violation of the 
federal securities laws and three years from the time the 
violation occurred. Gatto v. Meridian Medical Assoc., Inc., 
882 F.2d at 842. The district court held that this claim, 
brought more than two years after the discovery of the 
fraud and almost nine years after the transaction, was 
barred by the statute of limitations under S 29(b). Applying 
the statute of limitations from the corollary action to the 
plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief, we see no error in the 
district court's dismissal of the claim as time-barred. 
 
B. 
 
The district court also dismissed Count II as time-barred. 
Count II sought a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to 
section 508 of the Pennsylvania Securities Act ("PSA"), 70 
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Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1-508, the investor notes were void and 
unenforceable because they were induced by fraud in 
violation of Pennsylvania securities law. The district court 
concluded that the applicable statute of limitations was the 
one/four year statute of limitations, pursuant to 70 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 1-504. Section 504(a) states: 
 
       No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability 
       under section 501 (or section 503 in so far as it relates 
       to that section) unless brought before the expiration of 
       four years after the act or transaction constituting the 
       violation or the expiration of one year after the plaintiff 
       receives actual notice or upon the exercise of 
       reasonable diligence should have known of the facts 
       constituting the violation, whichever shall first expire. 
 
70 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1-504. Plaintiffs challenge application 
of this statute of limitations to their claim, asserting that 
the statute of limitations set forth in S 504 expressly does 
not apply to claims brought pursuant to S 508. 
 
Section 508 of the PSA provides that: 
 
       No person may base any suit on any contract in 
       violation of this act or any rule or order hereunder if he 
       has made or engaged in the performance of such 
       contract or has acquired any purported right under 
       any such contract with knowledge of the facts by 
       reason of which its making or performance was in 
       violation. 
 
70 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1-508. The plaintiffs have premised 
their claim for declaratory relief under this section of the 
PSA. This section, however, does not create an affirmative 
cause of action on which the plaintiffs can seek relief. 
 
Section 506 puts clear limitations on a party's ability to 
assert a right of action under the PSA. According to that 
provision: 
 
       Except as explicitly provided in this act, no civil 
       liability in favor of any private party shall arise against 
       any person by implication from or as a result of the 
       violation of any provision of this act or any rule or 
       order hereunder. Nothing in this act shall limit any 
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       liability which may exist by virtue of any other statute 
       or under common law if this act were not in effect. 
 
70 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 1-506. Section 508 does not explicitly 
provide for civil liability; rather, it simply creates a defense 
to any suit brought on a contract that violates the PSA. 
Thus, the plaintiffs could only have brought their action 
under S 501, which is expressly subject to the one 
year/four year statute of limitations of S 504. Therefore, 
plaintiffs' action for declaratory relief brought two years 
after they learned of the violation and over nine years after 
the allegedly fraudulent transaction, is barred by the 
statute of limitations applicable to the corollary legal claim. 
Judge Huyett, therefore, did not err in dismissing Count II 
as time-barred.3 
 
C. 
 
The district court dismissed Count III as time-barred. 
Count III sought a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to 
Pennsylvania common law, the investor notes are void and 
unenforceable as they were obtained by fraud in violation of 
Pennsylvania tort law. The statute of limitations in 
Pennsylvania is two years for "[a]ny other action or 
proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or 
property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or 
otherwise tortious conduct or any other action sounding in 
trespass, including deceit or fraud." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 5524(7). The plaintiffs concede that they knew of the 
fraud by October 11, 1993; the complaint was notfiled 
until November, 1995. An independent action clearly would 
be barred by the two-year statute of limitations governing 
fraud actions. Accordingly, the action for declaratory relief 
here is governed by the applicable statute of limitations on 
the concurrent legal remedy. We, therefore, see no error by 
the district court's dismissal of Count III as time-barred. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. An action brought in equity is governed by the doctrine of laches. See 
Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940). Therefore, had the plaintiffs 
sought equitable relief, or if the corollary action to their declaratory 
judgment suit is viewed as an action in equity, the claim would still be 
time-barred by the doctrine of laches. 
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III. 
 
The district court also dismissed Count IV of plaintiffs' 
claim which sought relief under the UTP/CPL, 73 P.S. 
S S 201-1 to 201-9.2. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought relief 
under S 201-9.2, which provides a private right of action 
for: 
 
       [A]ny person who purchases or leases goods or services 
       primarily for personal, family or household purposes 
       and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss . . . as a 
       result of the use or employment by any person of a 
       method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 3 
       of this act. 
 
The trial court stated that "[i]n order to bring a private 
action under Section 201-9.2, plaintiffs must show that 
they purchased or leased goods or services. Because 
plaintiffs' purchase of the Evergreen units does not involve 
the provision of a service, plaintiffs may bring an action 
under Section 201-9.2 if the units are "goods" within the 
meaning of the act." Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries 
Ltd. Partnership, 941 F. Supp. 495, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
The court then held that investment securities were neither 
goods nor services under its construction of Pennsylvania 
law. The court was also persuaded that the PSA covered 
conduct and practices relating to securities transactions to 
the exclusion of the Pennsylvania consumer protection 
laws, and that plaintiffs had failed to state a cause of action 
for which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the district 
court then dismissed Count IV. 
 
The district court examined the UTP/CPL in light the 
Federal Trade Commission Act ("FCTA"), 15 U.S.C. S S 41- 
47, as well as cases involving other state's unfair trade 
practices statutes with identical language. Pennsylvania 
courts have looked to the FCTA for guidance in construing 
the UTP/CPL. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, 
Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 818-20 (Pa. 1974). The FCTA has not 
been applied to securities transactions. As the district court 
observed, courts construing state law in light of the FTCA 
have found, that despite its broad language and remedial 
scope, the FTCA and similar state consumer protections 
laws do not extend to investment securities. See Spinner 
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Corp. v. Princeville Development Corp., 849 F.2d 388, 393 
(9th Cir. 1988); Stephenson v. Paine Webber Jackson & 
Curtis, Inc., 839 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1988); Lindner v. 
Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 
1985). In each of the foregoing cases, the courts noted that 
the state legislatures had enacted extensive laws regulating 
the sale of the securities. Giving plaintiffs a remedy under 
both consumer protection laws and securities laws would 
be "inconsistent with a coherent legislative intent." Spinner 
Corp., 849 F.2d at 391. Pennsylvania also extensively 
regulates securities transactions pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act of 1972, 70 P.S. S S 1-101 to 
1-704 (1994 and Supp. 1997), and provides remedies under 
that Act. We also believe that allowing plaintiffs to obtain 
remedies under both the UTP/CPL and the Securities Act is 
not consistent with coherent legislative intent. 
 
We turn to the question of whether an investment 
security is a "good" under the UTP/CPL. Although Denison 
acknowledged that reference to the FTCA for aid in 
interpreting the UTP/CPL is for guidance only and is not 
controlling, 759 F. Supp. at 205, the exclusion of securities 
from the definition of goods under the FTCA is consistent 
with Pennsylvania's rules of statutory construction. Thus 
we predict, as did the district court, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would hold that investment securities are 
not goods under the UTP/CPL and therefore the UTP/CPL 
does not provide a cause of action for a party alleging fraud 
in the securities themselves. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the district court did not err in dismissing Count IV of the 
plaintiff 's complaint for failure to state a cause of action 
upon which relief could be granted. 
 
We find no Pennsylvania case law addressing this issue. 
The plaintiffs argue that those federal courts that have 
confronted this issue have split on whether the UTP/CPL 
covers the sales of investment securities, while the majority 
holding that the UTP/CPL does cover these transactions.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See Lebovic v. Nigro, Civ. No. 96-319, 1996 WL 179982, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 15, 1996); S. Kane & Son Profit Sharing Trust v. Marine Midland 
Bank, Civ. No. 95-7058, 1996 WL 200603, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1996); 
Advest Inc. v. Kirschner, Civ. No. 92-6656, 1994 WL 18592, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 21, 1994); Denison v. Kelly, 759 F. Supp. 199, 202-05 (M.D. Pa. 
1991); McCullough v. Shearson Lehman Bros. Inc., 1988 WL 23008, *4 
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 1988). 
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Only one trial court, in addition to the district court in this 
case, has held that it does not. See Klein v. Opp, 944 F. 
Supp. 396, 398 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
A closer analysis of the cases relied upon by the plaintiffs 
show that they are distinguishable; most of the cases 
involved situations in which the alleged violation of the 
UTP/CPL was committed by a brokerage house customarily 
selling the securities of third parties. In this case, the 
plaintiffs have alleged that the fraud was in the valuation 
fixed by the issuer of the investment securities themselves 
and misrepresentations the issuer made concerning these 
securities. Plaintiffs have not alleged any fraudulent 
conduct in the actual sale of the securities. 
 
Denison, 759 F. Supp. at 199, the only case providing an 
analysis and reasoning for its conclusion that the UTP/CPL 
sale covers the investment securities, addressed a factually 
different scenario. There, the fraud alleged was in the 
actual sale of the securities from a brokerage house to the 
plaintiffs. In Denison, the plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants "had churned their account and had purchased 
investments inappropriate to the plaintiffs' stated desire for 
long term growth and appreciation." 759 F. Supp. at 200. 
Therefore, the alleged fraudulent conduct was in the 
"services" provided by the brokerage house, which is 
covered by the UTP/CPL. The plaintiffs did not allege any 
fraud related to the securities themselves. 
 
The other cases holding that the UTP/CPL covers the 
purchase of securities also deal specifically with the 
transaction, and not with the securities themselves. See S. 
Kane & Son, 1996 WL 200603, at *3 (claim that seller of 
investment used money in regular operations rather than in 
escrow account as promised and subsequently went 
bankrupt); Advest Inc., 1994 WL 18592, at *2 (actionable 
conduct was broker's fraudulent assurance that shares 
could be sold at profit); McCullough, 1988 WL 23008, at *4 
(claims allege that broker misled purchaser by providing 
inaccurate information and advice regarding securities).5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Two of the cases cited by the plaintiffs for the proposition that the 
UTP/CPL covers securities transactions assumed this for purposes of 
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These cases all involve the provision of services and thus 
are squarely within the protections of the UTP/CPL. 
 
The only case which cannot be so readily distinguished is 
Lebovic v. Nigro, 1996 WL 179982, *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 
1996). In Lebovic, the plaintiff orally agreed to form a new 
corporation with the defendant and bought "shares" in this 
new corporation. The defendant allegedly never performed 
his part of the oral bargain and converted the money 
plaintiff paid for these shares in the new corporation to his 
own personal use. 1996 WL 179982 at *1. The court, 
without analysis, held that the UTP/CPL applied to the 
purchase of securities, simply citing S. Kane & Sons, 
Denison, & McCullough. Id. at *2. The court then dismissed 
the claim, however, holding that the plaintiff, who had 
purchased the stock as part of an ownership agreement, 
was not a consumer within the contemplation of the 
UTP/CPL. Id. at *3. Thus, this case offers little support for 
the proposition that the UTP/CPL covers investment 
securities as "goods" under S 9.2. In fact, it could 
contemplate a ruling that the plaintiffs, purchasers of 
interests in a limited partnership, are not "consumers" 
protected under the UTP/CPL. 
 
The difficulty arises because the term "goods" is not 
expressly defined in the UTP/CPL. Pennsylvania law, 
however, has established rules of statutory construction to 
be employed when defining a term not defined in the 
statute itself. There are a number of approved ways of 
construing terms that are not otherwise defined in the 
statute. Generally, "[w]ords and phrases shall be construed 
according to their common and approved usage." 1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 1903(a). According to the dictionary, the term 
"goods" generally does not include securities. See Webster's 
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 360 (1969). Additionally, 
words can be construed by reference to other statutes. 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reaching other issues and did not directly reach that matter. See Klein 
v. Boyd, 949 F. Supp. 280, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (assuming UTP/CPL 
covers sale of securities to decide privity issue); Rosen v. Fidelity 
Fixed 
Income Trust, 169 F.R.D. 295 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (assuming UTP/CPL covers 
sale of securities to determine class certification issue). Thus, these 
cases are not persuasive on the critical issue before us. 
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Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 1921(c), 1932. The district court did just 
that, comparing the term "goods" under the UTP/CPL with 
the term "goods" under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
 
As the district court noted, the Pennsylvania legislature 
used the same language in section 201-9.2 of the UTP/CPL 
as it did in defining "consumer goods" in Pennsylvania's 
Uniform Commercial Code. Compare 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 9109 ("Goods are: (1) `Consumer goods' if they are used or 
bought for use primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes.") with 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 201-9.2 (providing 
right of action for person buying or leasing "goods or 
services primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes"). Under the UCC provision dealing with sales, 
"goods" is defined as "all things (including specially 
manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of 
identification to the contract for sale other than . . . 
investment securities." 13 Pa.Cons. Stat. S 2105(a). In fact, 
the Pennsylvania UCC contains a separate provision dealing 
solely with investment securities. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 8101 et seq. Thus, by comparing this statute to the UCC, 
the district court determined that the definition of goods 
under the UTP/CPL does not include investment securities. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, the district court committed no error in its 
order dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint. The dismissal of 
the action, however, is without prejudice to the plaintiffs' 
right to invoke the claims they have raised in this 
proceeding as defenses to any suit brought by the Trust to 
collect upon the notes referred to in this action. 
 
Each side to bear its own costs. 
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MANSMANN, J., dissenting. 
 
I believe that a party may bring a defensive declaratory 
judgment action to assert his non-liability for future 
obligations under a written instrument so long as the 
jurisdictional requirements of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act are satisfied, even when the party's unpursued cause of 
action for damages based on the same instrument is time- 
barred. I also believe that purchasers of investment 
securities may seek the protection of the Pennsylvania 
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law so 
long as the securities are purchased primarily for personal 
purposes. I respectfully dissent. 
 
I. 
 
The primary purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is 
"to avoid accrual of avoidable damages to one not certain of 
his rights and to afford him an early adjudication without 
waiting until his adversary should see fit to begin suit, after 
damage had accrued." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 
536, 543 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting E. Edelmann & Co. v. 
Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 1937)); 
accord Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 
1167-68 (7th Cir. 1969); Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. 
United States, 312 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1963). The Act 
allows "prospective defendants to sue to establish their 
nonliability." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 
500, 504 (1959). 
 
Bearing in mind the remedial character and legislative 
purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, we have 
repeatedly emphasized that the Act should have a liberal 
interpretation. Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 588 
F.2d 895, 900 (3d Cir. 1978); Simmons Aerocessories v. 
Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of Am., 257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 
1958); Aralac, Inc. v. Hat Corp. of Am., 166 F.2d 286, 291 
(3d Cir. 1948). Indeed, federal courts' jurisdiction over 
declaratory judgment actions are limited by just two 
primary considerations: the action must present a case or 
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controversy and it must be ripe for disposition. Travelers 
Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1995).1 
 
The district court and the majority do not contend that 
Algrant failed to satisfy the "case or controversy" or 
"ripeness" requirements under the Act. Rather, the majority 
agrees with the district court that Algrant's first three 
causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. 
 
Actions for declaratory relief do not have their own 
statute of limitations. See Luckenbach, 312 F.2d at 548 
("Limitations statutes do not apply to declaratory judgments 
as such. . . . There are no statutes which provide that 
declaratory relief will be barred after a certain period of 
time."). Rather, since "[d]eclaratory relief is a mere 
procedural device by which various types of substantive 
claims may be vindicated," it is the substance of the right 
sued on, and not the remedy invoked, that governs the 
applicable limitations period. Id. at 548 & n.2. As the 
district court observed, "the declaratory judgment action 
must be brought within the limitations period applicable to 
the substantive claim underlying the request for declaratory 
relief." Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. 
Partnership, 941 F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
The substantive claim Algrant seeks to vindicate in 
pursuing Counts I through III is the claim that Algrant is 
not liable for future obligations under the Investor Notes. 
Algrant invokes section 29 of the Securities and Exchange 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. To satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement, a declaratory 
judgment action must present a legal controversy (1) that is real and not 
hypothetical, (2) that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to 
provide the factual predicate for reasoned adjudication, and (3) that 
sharpens the issues for judicial resolution. Obusek, 72 F.3d at 1154 
(citing Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 (3d Cir. 
1992)). 
 
To satisfy the "ripeness" requirement, a plaintiff in a declaratory 
judgment action must demonstrate (1) that the probability of future 
harm is real and substantial, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment, (2) that the legal status 
of the parties will be changed by the declaration, and (3) that the 
declaratory judgment will have utility (i.e., that it will be of some 
practical help to the parties). Id. at 1154-55. 
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Act of 1934, section 508 of the Pennsylvania Securities Act, 
and common law fraudulent inducement for the sole 
purpose of establishing his non-liability under the Notes. 
Algrant does not seek damages pursuant to these laws; 
rather, Algrant relies on these laws to establish a defense to 
the defendants' anticipated claims to enforce the Notes. 
 
Since the substantive claim underlying the declaratory 
judgment action is Algrant's defense to the defendants' 
potential claim under the Notes, the declaratory judgment 
action is not time-barred until the defendants' claim is 
time-barred. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held in Luckenbach: 
 
       Non-liability is the negative of the claim or cause of 
       action with respect to which the declaration is sought. 
       For purposes of the statute of limitations non-liability 
       is inextricably linked with that cause of action. So long 
       as the claim can be made, its negative can be asserted. 
       When the claim itself has been barred, a declaration of 
       non-liability is also barred . . . . 
 
Luckenbach, 312 F.2d at 549; see also United States v. 
Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956) (statutes of 
limitations do not apply to defenses). 
 
The majority perceives Counts I through III quite 
differently. The majority focuses on the limitations periods 
governing offensive actions for damages brought under the 
laws which Algrant cites to establish a defense. The 
majority reasons that, since an independent cause of action 
for damages under these laws would have been barred, so 
too must a defensive declaratory judgment action which 
invokes these laws be barred. I believe that the majority 
misconstrues the nature of Algrant's claim. The substantive 
claim underlying Algrant's request for declaratory relief is 
not the claim for damages Algrant elected not to pursue; 
Algrant does not seek a coercive judgment. Rather, the 
substantive claim is the defendants' potential action against 
Algrant to enforce the Notes. Counts I through III do not 
exist for the purpose of establishing that the defendants 
committed fraud; rather, they exist to establish that Algrant 
is not liable under the Notes. Cf. Luckenbach, 312 F.2d at 
548 (declaratory judgment action may proceed when 
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plaintiff seeks "only a declaration of non-liability" and not 
a time-barred "coercive judgment"). 
 
The majority concludes that Algrant may not assert the 
defenses articulated in Counts I through III until the 
defendants seek enforcement of the Notes. Under the 
majority's reasoning, Algrant's claims are both stale and 
unripe; they were brought both too late and too soon. Given 
that the jurisdictional requirements of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act are satisfied now, it makes little sense to 
force Algrant to wait (while potential liability looms) until 
the defendants seek judicial enforcement of the Notes 
before asserting the very defenses which he properly asserts 
in this action. As a prospective defendant seeking to obtain 
an early adjudication of an actual controversy so as to 
avoid the accrual of avoidable damages, Algrant is exactly 
the type of person the Declaratory Judgment Act was 
intended to assist. 
 
The majority improperly links the timeliness of defensive 
declaratory judgment actions with the timeliness of other 
remedies that might have been available had Algrant 
chosen to pursue them. The Declaratory Judgment Act 
provides that courts "may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2201(a) (emphasis supplied). Indeed, when coercive relief 
is deemed unavailable, the court may, "if it serves a useful 
purpose, grant instead a declaration of rights." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 57 advisory committee's note. Thus, the availability of a 
declaratory judgment remedy is not dependent on the 
existence or timeliness of an alternative, coercive remedy. 
 
Written instruments "may be construed before or after 
breach at the petition of a properly interested party." Id. 
Under the majority's reasoning, however, written 
instruments may only be construed (1) after breach, in 
litigation of an action on that breach or (2) sufficiently 
before breach so as to coincide with a timely cause of 
action for damages based on conduct which may also 
render the written instrument unenforceable. During these 
periods, the declaratory judgment plaintiff ordinarily has 
other options (e.g., asserting a defense, bringing a claim for 
damages), and the declaratory judgment action often 
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becomes redundant. The majority prevents an individual 
from seeking a declaratory judgment when it would be most 
useful -- during an actual controversy, when the party 
threatened with liability desires an early adjudication to 
avoid the unnecessary accrual of damages without waiting 
until his adversary should see fit to begin an action after 
the damage has accrued. See Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. 
Supp. 1384, 1394 (D. Colo. 1996). 
 
In Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 
F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 1995), the plaintiff brought an action 
seeking a declaration that the requirement that she 
guarantee a loan for the benefit of her spouse was in 
violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. We held that 
even if the plaintiff's "right to initiate an action for damages 
based upon such alleged violations is barred by the statute 
of limitations, no such bar exists to asserting such violation 
as a defense to efforts to collect on said guaranty." Id. at 29 
(emphasis supplied). We permitted the plaintiff's 
declaratory judgment action to go forward because it was 
defensive in nature. The majority reads Silverman narrowly, 
concluding that the plaintiff 's declaratory judgment action 
was only permitted because the action was brought in 
response to the defendant's state court confession of 
judgment. 
 I interpret Silverman more broadly, to permit a party to 
bring a defensive declaratory judgment action (i.e., to 
thwart "efforts" to enforce a written instrument), even when 
the action raises issues that would be time-barred if 
brought offensively (i.e., to obtain damages). Id. at 32. The 
Declaratory Judgment Act permits parties to bring an 
action to establish a defense even before a controversy has 
reached the stage at which the declaratory judgment 
defendant may sue for coercive relief. By forcing Algrant to 
wait until the defendants bring suit on the Notes, the 
majority has undermined the primary purpose of the Act. 
 
The cases from our sister courts of appeals cited by the 
majority are distinguishable. In Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm 
Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993), for example, the 
plaintiff's challenge to an ordinance was time-barred 
because the plaintiff suffered a single harm, measurable 
and compensable when the ordinance was passed years 
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before. Id. at 688. The declaratory judgment action was no 
different in substance from the time-barred action for 
damages for the past injury. See also International Ass'n of 
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 
108 F.3d 658, 667-68 (6th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff 's claim for 
declaratory relief was tied to time-barred substantive claims 
for damages arising from prior breach of collective 
bargaining agreement; court was not faced with actual 
controversy about anticipated future breach); Clulow v. 
Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1293-95, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 
1983) (declaratory judgment plaintiff could not vindicate 
past alleged wrongs in claims that were inextricably linked 
to time-barred causes of action for damages). In contrast, 
Algrant does not seek to vindicate prior wrongs in an action 
indistinguishable from a time-barred offensive action for 
damages. Algrant merely seeks a declaration about a future 
obligation. 
 
In Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 
1991), also cited by the majority, the plaintiffs' "as-applied" 
challenge to an ordinance was barred by the statute of 
limitations because the injury was inflicted at the time the 
ordinance was applied; the substance of the claim was no 
different from the time-barred claim for damages. Id. at 57- 
58. Importantly, the court also noted that the declaratory 
judgment action was not yet "mature as to any potential 
enforcement action." Id. at 58 (emphasis supplied). The fact 
that "potential" enforcement actions remained mere 
"theoretical possibilities" rendered the plaintiffs' declaratory 
judgment action unripe. Id. In contrast, Algrant's 
declaratory judgment action is ripe; there is a present 
controversy about the defendants' expected enforcement of 
a future obligation.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The majority also cites Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29 
(2d Cir. 1983), but that case was decided under New York law. Id. at 41- 
42. Under Pennsylvania law, a party may pursue a declaratory judgment 
action to ascertain future obligations of the parties to a contract even 
though a damages claim for breach of contract is time-barred. Wagner v. 
Apollo Gas Co., 582 A.2d 364, 365-66 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In 
Pennsylvania, a four-year "catch all" statute of limitations applies to 
certain declaratory judgment actions, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 5525(8), but the statute does not begin to run until there exists an 
" `actual controversy' indicating immediate and inevitable litigation, and 
a direct, substantial and present interest." Wagner, 582 A.2d at 366. 
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II. 
 
The Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law ("UTP/CPL"), Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, S 201-1 
et seq., provides that any person who purchases "goods or 
services primarily for personal, family or household 
purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of 
money or property" may bring a private action for damages. 
Id. S 201-9.2(a). The legislative intent in enacting the 
UTP/CPL was "to enhance the protection of the public from 
unfair or deceptive business practices. . . . The central 
underlying intent was fraud prevention, and the act must 
be construed liberally to effectuate that remedial intent." 
Valley Forge Towers S. Condominium v. Ron-Ike Foam 
Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), 
aff 'd, 605 A.2d 798 (Pa. 1992); accord Commonwealth v. 
Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 815-17 (Pa. 
1974) (Consumer Protection Law is to be construed liberally 
to effect object of preventing unfair or deceptive practices). 
 
When determining the scope of the UTP/CPL, I note that 
the Act is not concerned with the type of product 
purchased; instead, it is concerned with the purpose of the 
purchase. "The purpose of the purchase, and not the type 
of product purchased, controls." Valley Forge, 574 A.2d at 
648 (emphasis in original). So long as the product 
(whatever its type) is purchased "primarily for personal, 
family or household purposes," the purchase is protected 
by the Act. Thus, in deciding whether the Evergreen units 
purchased by Algrant come within the protection of the 
UTP/CPL, we should focus on the purpose of the purchase. 
 
There is no indication that Algrant purchased the 
Evergreen units as a limited partner for a business 
purpose. Rather, the securities were purchased as personal 
investments. Due to the passive nature of the typical 
limited partnership arrangement, an individual who invests 
in a limited partnership is not characterized as engaging in 
business activity. See Freedman v. Tax Review Bd. of City 
of Phila., 243 A.2d 130, 133-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 
258 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1969). Algrant was a passive limited 
partner who did not participate in the business in any way. 
Since Algrant purchased the Evergreen units for a personal 
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purpose, he was not engaged in a business activity and the 
purchase is protected by the UTP/CPL. 
 
The majority focuses on the term "goods" and notes that 
investment securities are excluded from the definition of 
"goods" under the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code 
("UCC") provision dealing with sales. 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 2105(a). In so doing, the majority reads an exception 
into the UTP/CPL that is not present. Indeed, while the 
UCC may limit its scope by expressly excluding investment 
securities from its definition of "goods," Ifind it telling that 
the UTP/CPL does not contain such an exclusion. Cf. 
Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d at 824 (cautioning courts 
not to "woodenly apply" definition in UCC, which furthers 
commercial objectives, to the Consumer Protection Law, 
which furthers consumer objectives; to do so might"defeat 
the [Consumer] Law's remedial objects"). 
 
In Monumental Properties, the court emphasized its 
intention to interpret the Consumer Protection Law broadly: 
 
       There is no indication of an intent to exclude a class or 
       classes of transactions from the ambit of the Consumer 
       Protection Law. When the Legislature deemed it 
       necessary to make an exception from the Law's scope, 
       it did so in clear language. 
 
329 A.2d at 815 n.5. The UTP/CPL contains no "clear 
language" excluding the purchase of personal investment 
securities from the protection of the law. The legislature 
could easily include such language, as it did for 
broadcasters, printers and publishers. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 
73, S 201-3. Until the legislature chooses to create a 
"securities exception" to the UTP/CPL, the courts should 
not recognize one. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
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